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ENFORCEABILITY OF A LEASE TERMINATION CLAUSE IN
PROCEEDINGS UNDER BANKRUPTCY ACT, CHAPTER XI
Section 70b of the Bankruptcy Act allows an important remedy
to the landlord of a bankrupt tenant. The provision states: "[A]n
express covenant that. . . the bankruptcy of a specified party...
shall terminate the lease or give the other party an election to termi-
nate the same is enforceible."' When the estate of a bankrupt tenant
is liquidated and distributed to creditors, such a clause in a business
tenant's lease works no unusual hardship upon him .2 Section 302,
however, ensures that this landlord's remedy also will be available
in proceedings under Chapter XI3 of the Act, insofar "as [it is] not
inconsistent or in conflict with the provisions of this chapter
.... " Although one purpose of both Chapter XI and Chapter X5
is the financial rehabilitation of an insolvent debtor, rehabilitation
may be impossible if the debtor's lease is terminated as permitted
by section 70b. This possibility confronted the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in Queens Boulevard Wine & Liquor Corp. v.
Blum.6 Although the court attempted to restrict its opinion nar-
rowly, its refusal to enforce a termination clause in the circumstan-
ces of the case represents an inappropriate expansion of the equita-
ble powers of a bankruptcy court.
The debtor in Queens had entered into a seven-year lease in 1970
for the premises in which it operated a retail liquor store.7 The lease
was a standard form used in the state of New York and included a
1. 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970). Section 70b also gives a trustee in bankruptcy the authority
to reject executory contracts, including unexpired leases, within a limited time period. Id.
Section 342 of the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 742 (1970), provides that the powers given a trustee by
the Act may be exercised by a debtor in possession when no trustee or receiver is appointed.
2. J. MACLAcHLA, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUprCy 118, 173-74 (1956). Furthermore,
unless the lease is carefully drafted, termination by the landlord can work to his own disad-
vantage because of possible loss of priority under section 63a(9), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)(9). See
4A COULmR'S ON BANKnRUpTCY 70.44 (14th ed. rev. 1971) [hereinafter cited as CoLLIER].
3. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-799 (1970).
4. Section 302 makes all provisions of Chapters I to VII applicable in Chapter XI proceed-
ings so long as they are consistent with the provisions of Chapter XI. 11 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
Section 70b is included in Chapter VII of the Bankruptcy Act, a chapter pertaining expressly
to "bankruptcy" proceedings under Chapters I-VII. Despite the different objectives of bank-
ruptcy proceedings and of reorganizations and arrangements, section 70b also is applicable
in the latter proceedings. See, e.g., Finn v. Meighan, 325 U.S. 300, 302-03 (1945) (reorganiza-
tion); Geraghty v. Kiamie Fifth Ave. Corp., 210 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1954) (arrangement).
5. 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1970).
6. 503 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1974).
7. Id. at 203-04.
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clause permitting termination for nonpayment of rent or upon the
filing of a petition for adjustment of Queens' debts pursuant to
Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act.8 One month after filing such a
petition, Queens had neither paid certain rent arrearages nor posted
a bond for the rent in accordance with the bankruptcy referee's
order. With a solvent prospective tenant for the premises available,
the landlord served on Queens a notice of termination of the lease.
Thereafter, having obtained the required bond, Queens offered to
pay the three months rent in arrears, but the landlord rejected the
tender and pressed to have the bankruptcy court's stay of eviction
proceedings vacated.
When the landlord served the notice of termination on Queens,
the debtor and its unsecured creditors still were attempting to for-
mulate a satisfactory plan of arrangement. Because the location of
the liquor store was an important asset of the business, the plan
eventually devised was premised on Queen's continued occupancy
of the store for the remaining term of the lease. Although the referee
found that the landlord had not waived its option to terminate by
having continued to press for rent and that it had exercised the
option properly by the notice served on Queens, he ordered that
Queens continue in possession and pay to the landlord a sum equal
to the rent specified by the lease as compensation for use and occu-
pancy. .Confirmation of the plan of arrangement, however, was ad-
journed pending determination of petitions for review filed by both
the landlord and Queens.9
Even though it upheld the district court decision not to permit the
landlord to evict Queens, the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit conceded: "Bankruptcy forfeiture provisions are necessary for
8. Article 16(b) of the lease provided: "If at the date fixed as the commencement of the
term of this lease or if at any time during the term hereby demised... Tenant [shall] make
an assignment for the benefit of creditors or petition for or enter into an arrangement this
lease, at the option of Landlord, exercisedwithin a reasonable time afternotice of the happen-
ing of any one or more of such events, may be cancelled and terminated ... "503 F.2d at
203 n.1.
An addendum to the lease provided: "Notwithstanding the provisions of Article '16' hereof,
in the event no relief is requested in any of the bankruptcy proceedings set forth in Article
'16' hereof to disaffirm this lease, or to reform the same. . . and provided, further, that all
rent, additional rent and other charges due from Tenant under this lease are paid promptly
when due,. . . this lease shall not be terminated as provided in Article '16' hereof, but shall
continue in full force and effect." Id. n.2.
9. Queens petitioned to have the termination clause invalidated; the landlord, for review
of the referee's order. 503 F.2d at 204.
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the protection of landlords and generally are enforceable."'" Termi-
nation clauses in leases generally have been construed strictly
against the creditor-landlord, but enforced routinely," even when
the enforcement would vitiate an otherwise feasible plan to rehabili-
tate the debtor. 2 Because of the ambiguous legislative history" of
section 70b and the provisions in sections 10214 and 30215 to the effect
that sections governing "straight" bankruptcy should apply in pro-
ceedings under Chapters X and XI insofar as they were not incon-
sistent or in conflict with the provisions of those chapters, the Act
left open the question whether section 70b applied when the debtor
was not to be liquidated in bankruptcy proceedings. The issue was
first raised in 1945 in Finn v. Meighan,6 wherein the Supreme Court
asserted that Congress had provided that section 70b was applicable
in reorganization proceedings under Chapter X, and stated: "That
being the policy adopted by Congress, our duty is to enforce it."'7
Section 70b is no longer an absolute mandate that a termination
clause be enforced, however; in 1962 the language of the section was
amended to provide that such a clause "is enforceible." I By the
change from mandatory to permissive terminology, Congress ac-
commodated existing judicially created exceptions to the original
provision. 9 Two categories of exceptions were noted by the court in
10. Id. at 207. Even after its decision in Queens, the court had little difficulty applying
the general rule to uphold lease terminations when the debtor's extended failure to pay rent
had created financial difficulties for the landlord and the debtor had failed to present a
feasible plan for rehabilitation that had a reasonable chance for success. See In re D.H.
Overmeyer, Co., No. 74-2326 (2d Cir., Feb. 5, 1975).
11. See, eg., Finn v. Meighan, 325 U.S. 300 (1945); B.J.M. Realty Corp. v. Ruggieri, 326
F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1963); Model Dairy Co. v. Foltis-Fisecher Inc., 67 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1933);
Jandrew v. Bouche, 29 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1928); Empress Theatre Co. v. Horton, 266 F. 657
(8th Cir. 1920).
12. See, e.g., In re Technical Marine Maint. Co., 169 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1948).
13. When the Bankruptcy Act was amended substantially in 1938, the National Bank-
ruptcy Conference originally proposed a provision excluding section 70b from applying to the
other chapters, but the proposal was eliminated, apparently because it was too controversial.
Silverstein, Rejection of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy and Reorganization, 31 U. Cm.
L. REv. 467 n.127 (1964).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1970).
15. Id. § 702.
16. 325 U.S. 300 (1945).
17. Id. at 302-03.
18. Act of September 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-681, § 9, 76 Stat. 572, amending 11 U.S.C.
§ 110(b) (1958).
19. See generally S. REP,. No. 1954, 87th Cong., 2d Sees. (1962). The Report did not com-
ment specifically on this amendment, but stated that the general purpose of the bill was to
[Vol. 16:360
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Queens: First, a landlord may waive the right to terminate or be
estopped from asserting it if he evidences by his conduct an intent
to affirm the lease; 2 second, bankruptcy courts may at times refuse
enforcement 2 of a termination clause if it is unjust, and its effect is
only to frustrate a reorganization. 2
The district court in Queens had accepted the referee's finding
that the landlord had not waived its right to terminate since the
landlord had neither accepted rent under the lease after exercising
the right to terminate,2s nor delayed unreasonably in giving notice
of termination. The circuit court reluctantly accepted the finding
make a number of changes the need for which had become apiarent in the course of periodic
review of the operation of the Bankruptcy Act and which were considered noncontroversial.
20. 503 F.2d at 204. See Davidson v. Shivitz, 354 F.2d 946, 948 (2d Cir. 1966); B.J.M.
Realty Corp. v. Ruggieri, 338 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1964).
21. Powers exercisable by a bankruptcy court generally may be exercised by a referee in
bankruptcy because section 1(9) of the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1(9) (1970), defines "court" to include
the judge or the referee of the bankruptcy court.
22. 503 F.2d at 205. See Weaver v. Hutson, 459 F.2d 741 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
957 (1972); In re Fleetwood Motel Corp., 335 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1964).
The two cases basically represent the injection of the doctrine of "unconscionability" into
the issue of whether termination clauses are enforceable in proceedings under Chapter X. As
a matter of federal law, unconscionability is a valid defense in equity, and thus in the
bankruptcy courts. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948); In re Elkins-
Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966). But see Manufacturers Fin. Co. v. McKey,
294 U.S. 442 (1935) (where the creditor asked for no distinctly equitable relief, court powerless
to deny relief on equitable grounds).
When the question of unconscionability arises, "the basic test is whether, in the light of
the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case,
the clauses involved are so.one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances exist-
ing at the time of the making of the contract." UNwonm Commc. CoDn § 2-302, Comment
1 (1972 version). See also REsTATEME oF CONTACmS § 234, at 107-19 (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1970). Nevertheless, there is still controversy concerning the concept, and it has been argued
that the essence of unconscionability is in the consequences of a contract. See, e.g., Poulos,
A Review of Recent Law Review Articles on Unconscionability, 45 A. B mK. L.J. 195, 198
(1971).
In neither Weaver nor Fleetwood did the courts review the development of the doctrine of
unconscionability to determine whether the principle was applicable, although in both of
these cases the lease provisions could have been found to be unconscionable under the test
that seeks to determine whether the contracts were, in light of all the circumstances, reasona-
ble commerical devices. See In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., supra at 874. In both cases, the
forfeitures of large amounts of the debtors' property in addition to the reversion of the lessors'
land were considered the unreasonable elements. As the court discussed lucidly in Elkins-
Dell, the issues of unconscionability and the policy of the Bankruptcy Act should not be-
confused, a warning that was not heeded in Fleetwood, Weaver, and Queens.
23. Mere acceptance of payments for "use and occupancy" from the debtor does not consti-
tute acceptance of "rent." In re Wil-Low Cafeterias, Inc., 95 F.2d 306 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
304 U.S. 567 (1938).
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also, although noting that the landlord's conduct prior to giving
notice of termination "strongly suggests that it was willing to accept
payment of rent arrears, to forgive Queen's default and to continue
under the lease." 24
Besides the waiver exception to the general rule of enforceability
of termination clauses, in at least two cases prior to Queens, bank-
ruptcy courts in Chapter X proceedings have refused enforcement
by drawing upon their powers of equity to avoid injustice and pre-
vent the failure of a plan of rehabilitation. 25 Bankruptcy courts have
equity powers derived from several sources, including section 2a(15)
of the Bankruptcy Act,26 and, more generally, section 1651 of the
Judicial Code27 and the traditional equity powers of a court of bank-
ruptcy.8 Some decisions" have emphasized, however, what is now
24. 503 F.2d at 205. There is a hazard in loosely extending the waiver exception in the
manner hinted at in Queens; if the landlord could lose his right to terminate merely by his
readiness to continue the lease if the tenant would pay the rent due, he may be stripped of a
basis for bargaining with the tenant. One result could be that a landlord would not cooperate
in the efforts to rehabilitate a debtor-tenant in proceedings under Chapter XI unless willing
to waive the right to terminate. The superficial and unduly extended approach of some
bankruptcy courts to the question of estoppel has been criticized sharply. See J. MAcLAcHLm,
supra note 2, at 51.
25. See note 22 supra.
26. Section 2a(15) of the Act provides:
(a) The courts of the United States hereinbefore defined as courts of bank-
ruptcy are created courts of bankruptcy and are invested, within their respective
territorial limits as now established or as they may be hereafter changed, with
such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise original
jurisdiction in proceedings under this title, in vacation, in chambers, and during
their respective terms, as they are now or may be hereafter held, to-
(15) Make such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments, in
addition to those specifically provided for, as may be necessary for the enforce-
ment of the provisions of this [Act] ....
11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(15) (1970).
27. The Judicial Code provides: '"The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of
Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions
and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970).
28. See, eg., SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940);
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, IL. & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 675-76
(1935); 8 CoLtmm, supra note 2, 3.23. Judicial comments on the nature of a bankruptcy
court's powers of equity have been numerous. See, e.g., Cedar-Comp Materials Co. v. Bumb,
344 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1965); Fabs v. Martin, 224 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1955); United States v.
Duggan, 210 F.2d 926 (8th Cir. 1954); Solomon v. Gerstel, 207 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1953); Evarts
v. Eloy Gin Corp., 204 F.2d 712 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 876 (1953). The Supreme
Court's discussion in Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939), has had the greatest effect on
recent decisions. After emphasizing in Pepper that courts of bankruptcy are essentially courts
of equity, the Court stated that bankruptcy courts have invoked these equitable powers "to
the end that fraud will not prevail, that substance will not give way to form, that technical
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the statutory limitation in section 2a(15), that a bankruptcy court
is to exercise its equity power only "as may be necessary for the
enforcement of the provisions of [the Bankruptcy Act] ... "I'
Because a bankruptcy court is a statutory court created and gov-
erned by the Bankruptcy Act, courts typically have reasoned that
the specific provisions of the Act should prevail when they conflict
with general principles of equity.31 Despite the admonition of section
2b'2 that the powers of bankruptcy courts are not limited by the
enumerated powers in section 2a, it nevertheless should be apparent
that Congress did not intend that bankruptcy courts should be able
to exceed jurisdictional limitations within the Act itself in pursuit
of equitable goals.3
Two prior cases were used by the circuit court in Queens to sup-
port its refusal to enforce the termination clause. Weaver v.
Hutsone and In re Fleetwood Motel Corp.35 both concerned similar
fact situations in Chapter X proceedings. In Fleetwood a terniina-
tion clause in a 99-year lease of land provided for the lessor to take
title to a motel constructed thereon in the event of bankruptcy of
the tenant corporation. Annual rental for the land was forty thou-
sand dollars, while the equity of the corporation (and thus of its
shareholders) in the building exceeded five hundred thousand dol-
considerations will not prevent substantial justice from beingdone."Id. at305. This language
has encouraged increasingly liberal applications of equitable principles in the bankruptcy
courts. See generally Aug, Recent Trends in the Application of Equitable Principles in
Bankruptcy, 43 Pm. J. 109 (1969); Gleick, The Equitable Power of Bankruptcy Courts to
Subordinate Claims or to Disallow Claims Entirely on Equitable Grounds: A Discussion of
Developments, 33 REF. J. 69 (1959).
29. See, e.g., American United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138, 145 (1940);
In re Friedman, 232 F.2d 151 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 835 (1956); Solomon v. Gerstel,
207 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1953); In re Judith Gap Commercial Co., 5 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1925).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(15) (1970).
31. See, e.g., Luther v. United States, 225 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1954); Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Caldwell, 67 F.2d 802 (8th Cir. 1933).
32. Section 2(b) provides: "Nothing in this section contained shall be construed to deprive
a court of bankruptcy of any power it would possess were certain specific powers not herein
enumerated." 11 U.S.C. 11(b) (1970). But see In re Judith Gap Commercial Co., 5 F.2d 307
(9th Cir. 1925); 1 Cowan, supra note 2, 2.80. Section 2b has been interpreted infrequently
by the courts. In Judith Gap the courtrejected an argument that the section confirmed broad
equity powers in bankruptcy courts and asserted instead that bankruptcy proceedings,
though equitable, must be administered in accord with the Bankruptcy Act.
33. See, eg., SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965); In. re Texas
Consumer Fin. Corp., 480 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1973); Bank of Matin v. England, 352 F.2d 186
(9th Cir. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 385 U.S. 99 (1966).
34. 459 F.2d 741 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 957 (1972).
35. 335 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1964).
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lars. Relying upon the "inherent equity powers of a court of bank-
ruptcy," the court held the termination clause unenforceable be-
cause the forfeiture would entail the loss of more than a half million
dollars invested by the public and because no plan of reorganization
could be formulated if forfeiture were permitted." Weaver also in-
volved a long-term lease of land on which a lessee corporation con-
structed a motel. At the commencement of the proceedings, the
land was valued at one hundred fifty thousand dollars without im-
provements, while the debtor corporation's equity in the motel was
approximately one million dollars. All rents had been paid to the
lessor, and his financial interests were not in jeopardy. Citing
Fleetwood, the court refused to enforce the termination clause when
"the result of the forfeiture . . . would be the complete emascula-
tion of the reorganization because the forfeiture would remove the
entire res from the estate of the debtor. " 37
Two considerations supported the decisions in Fleetwood and
Weaver: the unconscionability of the "windfalls" to the landlord
resulting from forfeitures of substantial debtor property and the
undesirability of emasculating reorganization plans. Despite its as-
sertion that the rationale of both cases was applicable," even the
majority in Queens considered the landlord to be seeking only the
return of his own property.39 Furthermore, as Judge Hayes argued
in his dissent, 0 the benefit that the lessor would secure by termina-
tion of the lease "is present in every case like this because the
landlord would never terminate the lease unless he could relet at a
higher rent.""1 Moreover, the fact that the court did not discuss the
facts of the case as they might relate to the doctrine of unconsciona-
bility indicates that it did not consider the termination to be un-
conscionable. 2 Rather, it appears that the Queens decision at-
36. Id. at 862.
37. 459 F.2d at 744.
38. 503 F.2d at 206.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 207.
41. Id.
42. Among the factors that have been suggested as relevant in judging whether a security
provision is unconscionable are the following: the financial position of the bankrupt at the
time the agreement was entered into; the extent to which such agreements are customary;
the extent to which the security interest given reflects anticipated risks: the extent to which
the contract provision facilitated commerce by making credit available where it otherwise
would not be or impeded commerce by precluding access to other sources of credit; and the
effects of holding the provision unenforceable in bankruptcy on the future financing of similar
business. See In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 874 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
[Vol. 16:360
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tempted to stand primarily on the second leg of Fleetwood and
Weaver, that the termination clause was unenforceable because en-
forcement would prevent the financial rehabilitation of the debtor.
Viewed against the statutory scheme of the Bankruptcy Act, how-
ever, the attempt made to effectuate rehabilitation in Queens is an
inappropriate extension of the equitable powers of bankruptcy
courts in Chapter XI proceedings to accomplish an otherwise pro-
scribed alteration of rights other than those of unsecured creditors.
While both Chapters X and XI have a similar general purpose, the
financial rehabilitation of the insolvent debtor, Chapter XI concerns
arrangements only for settlement or satisfaction of unsecured
claims;43 other rights against the debtor may be adjusted in proceed-
ings under Chapter X.11 Whether a particular debtor should seek
relief under Chapter X or XI is not always readily apparent since
selection of the appropriate proceeding may depend upon a variety
of business and public interest considerations.45 More discernible,
however, are the differences in powers conferred upon the courts by
A landlord may be willing to lease premises to a marginal or speculative venture if, like a
creditor, he can "repossess" his property without delay should the venture fail. If thelandlord
cannot terminate the lease upon the insolvency of the tenant, he is placed at a disadvantage
relative to secured creditors. In considering a security arrangement the referee had labeled
"unconscionable" and unenforceable, the court in Elkins-Dell stated:
It would be a paradoxical course for the bankruptcy court, in the process of
protecting bankrupts and unsecured creditors, to adopt a principle which dealt
a coup de grace to other shaky businesses in need of financing but unable to get
it except upon terms unacceptable to the court as it views the transaction post
facto. It would be an egregious instance of "yielding to pity for the individual
case at the cost of a more inclusive rescue .... "
To hold these contracts unenforceable on their face would probably be to
impose a judicially invented but economically dysfunctional morality upon
knowledgeable contracting parties. It might jeopardize the availability of receiv-
ables financing for those from whom factoring is the only practicable way of
securing capital. It would be to add a risk of unenforceability to the other risks
inherent in such financing.
Id. at 871-72 (citation omitted). See also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d
445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
43. SEC v. AmericanTraler Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965); SECv. United States Realty
& Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940); In re Pioneer Sample Book Co., 374 F.2d 953 (3d
Cir. 1967); Chafee County Fluorspar Corp. v. Athan, 169 F.2d 448 (10th Cir. 1948); Bank-
ruptcy Act § 356, 11 U.S.C. § 756 (1970).
44. SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 452 (1940); 11 U.S.C.
§ 616(1) (1970).
45. SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 613-15 (1965). There is, however,
no discretion in selecting the appropriate proceeding; a Chapter XI proceeding must be
dismissed if Chapter X should have been utilized. Id. at 619-20 n.18; SEC v. Canadaigua
Enterprises Corp., 339 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1964).
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each chapter to accomplish a rehabilitation once the appropriate
proceeding has been selected.
Because section 35648 of the Act provides for the alteration only
of rights of unsecured creditors in Chapter XI proceedings, the eq-
uity powers of the court should be limited to the adjustment of
general claims against the assets of the debtor."7 While bankruptcy
courts in a Chapter XI arrangement have the power under section
31418 to stay the commencement or continuance of proceedings to
enforce liens against s]ecific property, they may not adjust, much
less extinguish, rights other than the claims against the debtor's
general assets." Thus they should not be able to refuse enforcement
to a landlord's contractual right of termination since that right is
not merely a claim against general assets of the debtor. Since sec-
tion 356 limits the interests which can be adjusted in a Chapter XI
proceeding, the reliance of the Queens court upon Weaver and
Fleetwood was misplaced;" those cases, concerning proceedings
under Chapter X, were decided pursuant to a much broader stan-
46. 11 U.S.C. § 756 (1970). The section provides: "An arrangement within the meaning of
this chapter shall include provisions modifying or altering the rights of unsecured creditors
generally or of some class of them, upon any terms or for any consideration."
47. Despite the importance of the concept to Chapter X, the Act nowhere defines the term
"unsecured creditor." Professor Moo, however, provides a working definition: "those creditors
who have not been granted special property rights or interests in some or all of the debtor's
property... ." Moo, The Secured Creditor in Bankruptcy, 47 Am. BAaNF. L.J. 23, 27 (1973).
A "secured creditor" is defined by section 1(28) of the Act to include "a creditor who has
security for his debt upon the property of the bankrupt of a nature to be assignable under
this [Act] or who owns such a debt for which some endorser, surety, or other person secondar-
ily liable for the bankrupt has such security upon the bankrupt's assets ... ." 11 U.S.c. §
1(28) (1970). For the purposes of a Chapter XI proceeding invclving more than a mere
extension of payment periods, section 307 defines "creditors" to include "the holders of all
unsecured debts, demands, or claims of whatever character against a debtor... "11 U.S.C.
§ 707 (1970).
48. 11 U.S.C. § 714 (1970). See note 65 infra & accompanying text.
49. See Chaffee County Fluorspar Corp. v. Athan, 169 F.2d 448 (10th Cir. 1948); In re
Camp Packing Co., 146 F. Supp. 935 (N.D.N.Y. 1956). For a critical discussion of the distinc-
tion between secured and unsecured creditors on the basis of their contractual rights, see
Poulos, Leading Case Commentary, 46 AM. BArm. L.J. 165 (1972).
50. The court in Queens stated. "Since Chapters X and XI both contemplate the continued
viability of the debtor, the fact that Weaver and Fleetwood arose in the context of Chapter
X proceedings does not diminish their relevance here." 503 F.2d at 205 n.6. There is ample
support, however, for declining to distinguish Weaver and Fleetwood from Queens merely on
the basis that the two Chapter X cases involved substantial amounts of public investment.
The Supreme Court specifically rejected an attempt to make the presence of publicly held
debt the sole determinant for selecting between proceeding under Chapter X or Chapter XL
See SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 613 (1965).
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dard, section 216,5' which specifically gives the court greater control
over all claims against the debtor, including the adjustment of
claims held by both secured creditors and stockholders.
Schokbeton Industries, Inc. v. Schokbeton Products Corp.52 illus-
trates the constraints placed upon the equitable powers of a court
by Chapter XI. Acknowledging that the effect of its holding was to
jeopardize seriously the debtor's chances for financial rehabilita-
tion, 3 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit nevertheless dis-
solved an injunction that prevented the operation of a termination
clause in a valuable exclusive licensing agreement.5 Although sec-
tion 70b would have permitted the debtor to reject the entire execu-
tory contract," the court held that the debtor could not keep the
contract in effect to retain its benefits, while at the same time
seeking to prevent the licensor from exercising his own contractual
right to end the agreement under the termination clauseY The ef-
fect of the decision is that a bankruptcy court which has statutory
authority in a Chapter XI proceeding to allow the rejection of an
entire contract still may not rely on equity powers to rewrite partic-
ular provisions so as to alter rights under the contract; this limita-
tion contrasts sharply with the court's specific authority pursuant
to section 356 to adjust the claims of unsecured creditors against the
general assets of the debtor. Even when the party whose rights the
court attempts to adjust engaged in conduct sufficiently reprehensi-
ble as to shock the conscience of the court, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit subsequently rejected the exercise of equity powers
in a Chapter XI proceeding when claims other than those of unse-
cured creditors would be altered.57
Although the lease termination clause that the Queens court re-
fused to enforce can be distinguished somewhat from that of the
license agreement in Schokbeton on the basis of the barnacles of
property law that adhere to the concept of a lease, 5 the termination
51. 11 U.S.C. § 616 (1970).
52. 466 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1972).
53. Id. at 177.
54. Id. at 178. The court admitted the possibility that a bankruptcy court might stay
temporarily the enforcement of a contractual right, id. at 176-77, but it equated the indefinite
postponement of the debtor's obligation to perform to the nullification of the licensor's con-
tractual rights, id. at 176.
55. See note I supra.
56. Id. at 175, citing inter alia Hurley v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 213 U.S. 126 (1909).
57. See In re Texas Consumer Fin. Corp., 480 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1973).
58. The lease is a legal concept unique to itself: "Much has been written about the nature
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clause itself should be recognized as giving the landlord a right
distinct from his right to receive rent under the lease. Clearly the
latter obligation creates a claim on the part of the landlord against
the debtor's general assets, and that claim may be adjusted by a
bankruptcy court in a Chapter XI proceeding. 9 Nevertheless, it is
just as clear that the landlord enjoys a status not unlike that of a
secured creditor in certain regards;6" his right to terminate gives him
a right exercisable, not against the debtor's general assets as an
unsecured creditor, but against a specific property interest of the
debtor, the leasehold. 1 Although, in an analogous context, a secured
creditor might waive its security by filing a claim against a debtor's
general assets, 2 the court in Queens found, however reluctantly,
that the landlord had not waived its rights under the termination
clause of the lease. As a consequence, the court's refusal to enforce
the clause constituted more than a simple adjustment of an unse-
cured claim against the general assets. Whether viewed as a con-
tract right like that in Schokbeton or as a right against specific
property analogous to a security interest, the landlord's right to
of a lease, whether a conveyance or, as in the civil law, a contract. The obvious answer is
that it is both .... The lease operates to convey a possessory estate to the lessee. . . . But
any modem lease also contains numerous contractual provisions. . . . If the warp is convey-
ance, the woof is contract and neither alone makes a whole cloth." 1 AmaUcAN LAW OF
PROPmRTY § 3.11, at 202-03 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
59. See Bankruptcy Act § 353, 11 U.S.C. § 753 (1970).
60. As explained by one commentator:
A lessor having a right to forfeit a lease in case of default is like a secured
creditor. If it is advantageous to the estate to prevent a forfeiture of the lease, a
payment of rent for that reason is not a preference, even in the absence of any
distress or statutory landlord's lien. If, however, the landlord does not enter for
condition broken, he is not regarded as having realized upon a security which
must be valued under section 57h and deducted from his claim for rent in
arrears. If the landlord elects to continue the lease and to prove in bankruptcy
or arrangement proceedings, he may accordingly file a claim which may some-
times be put in a class by itself.
J. MACLAcHLAN, supra note 2, at 397 (footnotes omitted). See also Festersen, Equitable
Powers in Bankruptcy Rehabilitation: Protection of the Debtor and the Doomsday Principle,
46 A. BANmm. L.J. 311, 335 (1972); Silverstein, Rejection of Executory Contracts in Bank-
ruptcy and Reorganization, 31 U. Cm. L. Rav. 467, 484 (1964).
61. The similarity between the interests of lessors and secured creditors is illustrated by
the fact that secured creditors may attempt to achieve the generally more protected status
of lessor by drafting security agreements in the form of leases. See generally Del Duca,
Evolving Standards for Distinguishing a "Bona Fide Lease" from a "Lease Intended as
Security"-Impact on Priorities, 75 CoM. L.J. 218 (1970).
62. See United States Nat'l Bank v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 331 U.S. 28 (1947).
63. See notes 23-24 supra & accompanying text.
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terminate gives him a claim that cannot be extinguished by use of
the court's equity powers without exceeding the limits imposed
upon those powers by Chapter XI.
If adjustment of a lessor's right to terminate a leasehold is neces-
sary for the rehabilitation of the debtor, reorganization under
Chapter X is appropriate. While the choice between proceeding
under Chapter XI or Chapter X is not discretionary, the standard
for reorganization pursuant to the former is that an arrangement
under the latter would be ineffective. 4 If rehabilitation would be
impossible without extinguishing the landlord's right of termina-
tion, the requirements for a Chapter X reorganization would be met
because the necessary relief could not be accomplished in accord-
ance with the limitations imposed upon the court's equity powers
by Chapter XI.
Relief for the financially strained small business may yet be avail-
able under Chapter XI, however, without the overextension of the
bankruptcy court's equity powers illustrated by Queens. Section 314
of the Act" authorizes the court in a Chapter XI proceeding, upon
a showing of cause, to stay the commencement or continuation of
actions to enforce a lien against property. Moreover, courts on occa-
sion have exercised equitable powers to stay the eviction of a debtor-
tenant even after the landlord has established his right to immedi-
ate possession. A stay so indefinite in duration as to constitute a
practical extinguishment of the landlord's right to terminate the
lease would be just as much an overextension of equitable powers
as was the Queens court's refusal to enforce a termination clause.6
64. SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 607 (1965).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 714 (1970). Similar relief is available also in Chapter X. See 11 U.S.C. §§
513, 516(4), 548 (1970).
66. See In re Program Aids Co. Inc., 310 F. Supp. 198 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); In re Lane Foods,
Inc., 213 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). In Program Aids the referee attempted to keep the
debtor-tenant in business for the benefit of creditors while also permitting the landlord to
initiate a more profitable lease with a new tenant. The court did not find that the referee
had exceeded the bounds of his equitable powers by his purportedly temporary refusal to
honor the landlord's right to terminate the lease, but it suggested that the referee consider
limiting the debtor's possession to no more than eight months from the date of filing the
petition pursuant to Chapter XI. 310 F. Supp. at 198. In Lane Foods the court permitted an
80-day stay of the execution of a properly obtained eviction warrant, stating that the equita-
ble powers of the court were sufficient to defer the landlord's right of reentry. 213 F. Supp.
at 133. See also In re Walker, 93 F.2d 281, 283 (2d Cir. 1937).
67. See note 54 supra. One commentator has noted: "[S]ince the plan in Chapter XI can
ultimately affect the rights of unsecured creditors only, the court cannot legally or in good
conscience stay secured creditors indefinitely. There is no such component of conscience in
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Properly circumscribed, however, a temporary stay can permit the
debtor to remain in possession of valuable premises while he renego-
tiates his debts, obtains additional financing, or seeks an alternate
location for his business;"8 it thus can facilitate rehabilitation of the
debtor without resort to Chapter X reorganization.
Temporary restraint of the landlord's effort to reenter the prem-
ises may not have been effective in. Queens because a new solvent
tenant was willing to rent the store building at an increased rental
immediately and the obtaining of alternate premises by Queens
would have offered no relief since the specific location was the liquor
store's principal asset in rehabilitation. 9 Barred from such a com-
promise, the court nevertheless had no authority under Chapter XI
to refuse to enforce the lease termination clause because relief under
that chapter is limited to adjustment of unsecured claims; extin-
guishment of the landlord's right to reenter could only have been
accomplished properly in a Chapter X proceeding.70 For the court
to have denied the right in an arrangement pursuant to Chapter XI
represents an exercise of the court's equity powers in a manner that
fails to comport with the statutory framework of the Bankruptcy
Act.
Chapter X and some secured creditors really take a beating during the delay." Seidman,
Chapter X or Chapter XI?, 76 COM. LJ. 33, 34 (1971).
68. See generally Herzog, Bankruptcy Law-Modem Trends, 37 REF. J. 48 (1963).
69. 503 F.2d at 204.
70. If current recommendations, see CoMOssIoN ON THE BAsmmUroy LAws OF TH UNtieD
STATES, REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), were to be enacted, the
substitution of a new Chapter VII for the present Chapters X and XI would provide for the
rehabilitation of the corporate debtor through a variety of means not limited to the adjust-
ment of unsecured claims. See Trost, Corporate Reorganizations Under Chapter VI of the
"Bankruptcy Act of 1973". Another View, 48 Am. BANKrt. L.J. 111, 137-38 (1974).
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